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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the hypothesis that corporatist intermediation by
party governments facilitates incomes policy formation and is effective in
reaching agreements between employers and trade unions as well. A
social democratic party in government would positively enhance this
process. Investigating this for the Netherlands between –, two
puzzles emerge. The first puzzle is that coalition governments of Social
and Christian Democracy fall short of expectations despite their com-
mitment to corporatism. The second puzzle is that the relationship
between Social Democracy and effective corporatist intermediation is
positive but cannot sufficiently account for the variation in agreements on
Dutch incomes policy. That variation can be better understood as
induced by institutional change, economic development and external
vulnerabilities. The Dutch case study shows that the performance of a
social democratic party in government in a corporatist context is less
directly effective than the literature often has suggested.
Introduction
The emergence of the purple coalition governing the Netherlands
(–) aroused new interest for corporatism in relation to partisan
control of government (Slomp ; van Waarden ; Hemerijck ;
Vergunst ; Woldendorp ). In large part this is related to the
remarkable recovery of the Dutch economy from the Dutch disease to
a Dutch miracle (Visser and Hemerijck ; Becker ). And its
performance was remarkable: the Netherlands comfortably met the
requirements for the introduction of the Euro in  (the state debt was
reduced and deficit spending disappeared); unemployment and inflation
(the misery index) was comparatively low over time and across Europe
(Woldendorp : –). In other words, politics mattered (again) in
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the Netherlands and party government appeared capable of producing
a comparatively successful performance by means of corporatist
intermediation.
In the literature a number of factors are mentioned to account for this
success: the first-ever emergence of a purple coalition between Social
Democracy (PvdA) and conservative liberals (VVD) that heralded a fresh
approach of party government without Christian Democracy (Christen-
Democratisch Appe`l – CDA) that always occupied the centre of gravity
within the Dutch political system until . This shift appeared as a
result of a Third Way approach avant la lettre, and a more left-liberal
leaning of the VVD (Pennings ). Another factor is the international
recovery of the world market, and in particular of world trade (Scharpf
; Keman ). Lastly, the successful transformation of the employ-
ment structure in the Netherlands as a result of the continuing trend of
de-industrialization (Esping-Andersen ; Keman et al. ).
Yet, although partisan factors may well have shaped the context for a
successful recovery of the Dutch economy, these are insufficient to
account for the Dutch miracle per se. For we have a puzzling situation at
our hands: an essential component of Dutch socio-economic policy
formation concerns corporatist interest intermediation, which has always
been negotiated at the central level by means of party government. This
phenomenon, often labelled the polder model, seems to have been
conducted more effectively under the aegis of the Left (PvdA) and Right
(VVD), and less when the CDA – the pivot of the Dutch party system
until  (Keman : –) – has been involved in government.
This is surprising, for Christian Democracy is generally considered to be
in favour of corporatist modes of policy concertation (Wilensky ; van
Kersbergen , ; van Waarden ; see also Smith ; Cox
, Lijphart and Cre´paz ). As Figure  illustrates, corporatism
features prominently in Christian Democratic party programmes since
the mid-s when the Dutch disease was considered to be at its worst.
Nevertheless, a PvdA-VVD coalition has been more capable to find
consensus on incomes policy than coalitions in which the CDA was
involved (Woldendorp : ). At first glance the Dutch case supports
the comparative literature claiming that Social Democracy and corpo-
ratism act together in a favourable manner to produce a positive
economic policy performance (Cameron ; Marks ; Kurzer ;
Cre´paz ; Woldendorp ).
Why is it that coalitions dominated by the CDA are outperformed by
coalitions dominated by the PvdA when it comes to a corporatist mode
of incomes policy, when this christian democratic party advocates
corporatism and has been in government uninterrupted between 
and ? In addition, how come that its competitors do not only do
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better by using corporatism as a means to develop consensual types of
incomes policy formation, but also appear to be more effective in
reaching a Central Agreement on incomes policy among the actors
involved?
In order to find an answer to these puzzles we introduce a classification
of corporatist behaviour of the three actors involved – government,
employers’ organizations and trade unions – in the annual process of
negotiations aiming at a Central Agreement on incomes policy. The
classification allows for systematically comparing through time how the
negotiations were conducted. The government’s strategy is operational-
ized as facilitating consensus formation or not (policy concertation). The
attitude of the employer’s organizations and the trade unions is classified
as more or less co-operative. In addition we recorded whether or not the
strategy and attitudes of the actors involved did change during the
negotiations (Woldendorp : –).
Based on the Table Appendix (annual scores) we have calculated the
aggregated relationship between corporatist concertation and reaching a
F  Corporatism as an issue in election programmes of government parties
Note: Corporatism based on Budge et al (: ). CDA prior to  is
KVP, ARP, and CHU combined (see note ).
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Central Agreement by all governments. When government has been
active to promote a corporatist strategy (% of all cases), it appears this
is indeed conducive to a positive outcome (% of all cases). Conversely,
when a corporatist strategy is not conducted then in only  per cent
this is the case. Corporatist intermediation appears to matter in the
Netherlands. This finding confirms the comparative literature.
What is puzzling, however, is the performance of the different coalition
governments. First with regard to the implementation of a corporatist
mode of incomes policy and second with regard to reaching a Central
Agreement. When the PvdA was in coalition with the CDA a corporatist
strategy was implemented in  per cent of the years, whereas a coalition
of PvdA and VVD did so in all years (%). Coalitions of CDA and
VVD on the other hand employed a corporatist strategy in only  per
cent of the years. The presence of a social democratic party makes a
difference, whereas this is not the case with Christian Democracy.
The same goes for achieving a Central Agreement. When the PvdA
is in coalition with the CDA, the success rate of corporatist strategies is
 per cent (% of all cases), whereas in coalitions with the VVD it is
 per cent (% of all cases). When the CDA is in coalition with the
VVD the success rate of corporatist strategies drops sharply to  per cent
(% of all cases), but these coalitions appear to be more successful with
their non-corporatist strategies: a success rate of  per cent (% of all
cases), bringing the overall success rate of all strategies of these coalitions
to  per cent (% of all cases).
In the Netherlands corporatist intermediation appears effective when
government actively seeks this type of policy performance (%), but
CDA involvement does not live up to expectations, although CDA-VVD
coalitions score some success with non-corporatist strategies as well.
Conversely, Social Democracy in coalition with CDA as well as with
VVD appears to perform better, both with respect to corporatist
strategies as with Central Agreements. These puzzles beg for an
explanation, for if different party coalitions and social partners do not
consistently matter, other factors ought to be taken into account as well
to explain the variation over time.
In line with other explanations we propose that these puzzles may be
solved by focusing on macroeconomic development, institutional changes
within the incomes policy framework, and limitations arising from the
EMU requirements (Katzenstein ; Scharpf ; Cameron ;
Iversen ). We argue that these exogenous factors allowed the
coalition governments of PvdA and VVD of the s to implement more
corporatist strategies than many expected (and immediately labelled part
of the Dutch miracle – see also Delsen ). We contend that the
combination of macroeconomic circumstances and institutional changes
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is quite important for a proper understanding of the eventual effective-
ness of corporatist strategies of the different coalition governments in
reaching Central Agreements. The main indicators with respect to
economic development and institutional change are reported in Tables 
and .
The Dutch disease in the s and s is indeed closely related to
the increasing and lasting level of unemployment, deficit spending and
a growing level of public debt. At the same time the openness of the
economy increased considerably whereas economic growth was moder-
ate. Together with the effects of the EMU requirements this has led to
a reorientation of fiscal policy formation, whereas wage formation
remained at the core of economic policy formation (Scharpf ;
Keman ).
The institutional framework of incomes policy has been regularly
changed since . The formal context (Law on Wage Formation) has
been conducive to a relaxation in the mode of industrial relations in the
Netherlands. Gradually, the guidance by the state has been replaced by
a structure that allows more freedom to the social partners to negotiate.
An important element is the decentralization of negotiations and the
development of bi-partite agreements (in particular since the s: the
Wassenaar Agreement in  and the amendments to the Law on Wage
Formation in ). Finally, the linkage of market sector wage levels to
the public sector (including income transfer entitlements) is introduced
during the s and changes regularly.
T : Indicators of macroeconomic vulnerabilities (–)
Year
Macroeconomic Indicators
Unemployment Inflation Openness Growth Deficit Public Debt
 .% .% .% .%  .% .%
 . . . .  . .
 . . .  .  . .
 . . . .  . .
 . . . .  . .
 . . . .  . .
 . . . .  . .
 . . . . + . .
Mean . . . .  . .
Change / .  . .  . . .
Sources: Woldendorp () based on OECD and Comparative Political Dataset I (Armingeon
et al. ). Note: Unemployment: Standardized unemployment rates as per cent of the total labour
force. Inﬂation: Consumer price index, per cent change from previous year. Openness: Sum of total
import and export in per cent of GDP. Growth: Annual real economic growth in percentage of
GDP. Deﬁcit: Public expenditures minus total revenues in percentage of GDP. Public Debt: General
government gross public debt in per cent of GDP.
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To sum up: we contend that Dutch corporatism is at best a favourable
institutional arrangement for developing and implementing an incomes
policy. The political room for manoeuvre (composition of coalition), on
the one hand, and the economic circumstances, on the other hand, are
important factors determining both party government’s pursuit of a (non)
corporatist strategy as well as its success (Central Agreements).
This line of argument implies that we – unlike other students of
corporatism – see corporatism and its policy related performance as a
variable based on strategic choices of party government and social
partners and not as a more or less static institutional arrangement within
a polity (but see Siaroff ; Vergunst ). To underscore this
empirically we will analyse the Dutch performance by examining the
annual outcomes of the negotiations on incomes policy in relation to the
role played by government and social partners.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section  discusses the
formation of Dutch coalition governments. Section  deals with part one
of the puzzle: the use of various corporatist and non-corporatist strategies
across different party coalitions after . In section  part two of
T : Institutional change within bargaining framework on incomes policy
Year Law on Wage Formation Decentralization
of negotiations
Linkage
mechanism
Strike
Behaviour
 Relaxation of guidance
nation-wide wage levels
Decentral agreements
optional
None .
 Free negotiations formalized by
law with restrictions: Clause 
and 
No change None .
 Clause  ‘ frozen’ and 
operational
No change Linkage .
 No change No change No change .
 Wassenaar Agreement between
social partners enforced and
endorsed by government
Bi-partite negotiations
encouraged and market
sector decentralized
Delinkage .
 Law of  amended ()
reducing government
interference
No change Temporary
relinkage
.
 No change, but reduction role
of SER and EMU requirements
enforced
No change Temporary
delinkage
.*
 No change No change Temporary
relinkage
.
Note: Derived from Woldendorp . Strike behaviour: number of working days lost per .
employees (average for the previous five years:  = average – and so on) taken from
Armingeon et al. .
*The average – is mainly due to one strike of long duration in . The average for
– corrected for this outlier would be ..
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the puzzle is discussed: assessing for the variation in effectiveness
of corporatist strategies of the various coalition governments. By way of
conclusion, in section  the role of corporatism and Social Democracy
will be reassessed in view of effective policy concertation.
Dutch coalition government: Governing from the centre?
Although Christian Democracy and Social Democracy have often been
together in government, this does not mean that they are by definition
coalition partners. In Figure  the relative distances on the Left-
Right dimension between the three main governmental parties in the
Netherlands are pictured. The CDA has been the party of the centre ever
after . After , policy distances between Left and Right have
diminished and the three main parties were converging.
Due to the multi-party system the CDA has been able to dominate
government formation. Until  the CDA alternated between Left and
F  Left–Right diﬀerences between parties of government
Note: Left–Right index developed by Pennings and Keman (: ),
based on Budge et al (). CDA prior to  is KVP, ARP, and CHU
combined (see note ).
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Right. Contrary to the comparative literature, assuming that the rela-
tionship between Social Democracy and corporatism is based on its
dominance in government, the Dutch labour party was hardly in a
commanding position in government. In addition, the PvdA did not
prevail in the so-called socio-economic policy sector in government (i.e.
controlling the ministries of Finance, Economic Affairs and Social
Affairs – the latter responsible for matters of incomes policy). Only after
 – the era of PvdA and VVD coalitions – this situation changed to
some extent: the social democrats held the Premiership as well as the
Ministry of Social Affairs (Woldendorp et al. : ).
The political landscape already underwent certain changes before that
time. These developments involved the fragmentation of the established,
pillarized party system after the s. During the s the three
confessional parties always chose to govern with the VVD unless they
lost their combined majority in parliament. Under these circumstances
the PvdA conducted its polarization strategy, believing that the eventual
decline of the confessional parties would result in a transformation of the
party system in which both the PvdA (left) and the VVD (right) could
prosper. In addition, the natural allies of Social Democracy – the trade
unions – not only merged (the Catholics and the Social Democrats), but
also were quite militant in the s (Table ). This did not help
tri-partite negotiations until the s. In sum: in the s and early
s, coalition governments went back and forth between centre-left
coalitions of CDA and PvdA and centre-right coalitions of CDA and
VVD and had to negotiate with social partners that were reluctant as well
as hostile (Andeweg and Irwin ).
In the s and early s, the CDA remained both the dominant
and central party in parliament and government and determined
whether it was to be a centre-right coalition with the VVD, or a
centre-left coalition with the PvdA. After , when the PvdA had
abandoned its polarization strategy following the short-lived coalition in
–, the CDA considered the PvdA to be a potential coalition
partner again. This led to a coalition between CDA and PvdA in .
The next election () turned out to be disastrous for both parties.
However, the CDA lost more seats than the PvdA, which became the
largest party in parliament. The centre-left coalition of CDA and PvdA
was replaced by the purple coalition in which PvdA and VVD co-
operated. For the first time since , the CDA (or one or more of its
forebears) was not in government. And for the first time since , PvdA
and VVD were together in government. Figure  illustrates that this
novelty was slowly in the making: both parties were never so close to each
other in terms of the Left-Right distance since the s. Finally, it should
be realized that a change was needed in view of mediocre economic
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circumstances and the high levels of deficit spending and public debt
compared to the EMU requirements that were set in . These
circumstances led to debates on welfare state retrenchment and active
labour market policies (Keman et al. ).
In most coalition governments not only the party composition is at
stake, but also the distribution of portfolios among the participating
parties. In particular for government coalitions with more or less equally
strong partners (Laver and Shepsle ; Mu¨ller and Strøm ; Keman
). The Netherlands is not different in this respect. In Dutch coalition
governments, the distribution of portfolios is in general largely propor-
tional to the respective party’s seats in parliament. Larger parties usually
get slightly fewer portfolios than their seats in parliament, smaller parties
slightly more (Woldendorp et al. : –). With respect to the
ministries claimed by respective coalition parties, the largest party usually
takes the post of Prime Minister. Equally relevant is, that in coalition with
the PvdA or the VVD, the CDA (or its precursors) always took the
portfolio of Social Affairs (which includes Labour relations), the ministry
that is directly responsible for incomes policy (see Table ).
It was only in the purple coalition after  with the VVD and D
(Democraten), that the PvdA became the dominant party in government
and held both the office of Prime Minister and the Ministry of Social
Affairs. But the PvdA did not dominate the socio-economic policy sector,
as the CDA used to do. In coalition governments before , the CDA
was the dominant party in government and primarily responsible for
incomes policy. In other words, the hypotheses governing international
research into the relation between Social Democracy and corporatism
appear to apply in the Netherlands mainly to the years after .
However, as both Social and Christian Democracy are in favour of
T : Features of party government and policy control (–
)
Indicators
Government party
CDA PvdA VVD
Years in government % % %
Having the Premier-ship [N = ] % % %
Parliamentary support [average] % % %
Control of Social-Economic Policy Sector % % %**
of which Social Affairs (including Labour) .% .% .%
Sources: Woldendorp et al. (: , –); Andeweg and Irwin ().
Note: Calculated by Number of years () and Number of governments ().
**Includes ministers of D (N = ), a minor secular party positioned between
PvdA and VVD.
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corporatism, the variation across all coalition governments between
– as regards corporatism and effective incomes policy concer-
tation makes our puzzles only more intriguing.
The Dutch puzzle part one: Accounting for variation in government strategies
In this section we focus on the relationship between the partisan compos-
ition of government and their use of a corporatist strategy to develop and
implement incomes policy. The puzzle is that although there is a strong
tradition of corporatist policy concertation in the Netherlands which is
promoted by its two largest parties (Fig. ), this appears not as effect
producing when both parties are in government together. This observation
is in contrast with much of the literature on corporatism and the role of
party government (in which the Dutch case is almost always prominently
present). Therefore, so we argue, other factors ought to be taken into
account to explain the inter-temporal variation in the Netherlands. We
shall first scrutinize the way the three coalition types have utilized the
corporatist mode of interest intermediation to further incomes policy
formation in terms of their opening and concluding strategies.
CDA and PvdA in coalition: Good intentions but limited success
Between  and  CDA and PvdA were in coalition for  years. As
the table in the Appendix shows this coalition pursued respectively an
opening ( times – %) and a concluding corporatist strategy ( times –
%). However, in four years (%) these coalitions concluded with a
non-corporatist strategy. In these four years (, , , and )
social partners were either unable or unwilling to come to an agreement
on incomes policy on the central level.
In , trade unions and employers’ organizations looked to the
government to break the deadlock in their negotiations. The government
therefore determined incomes policy in this year. That government
intervention has to be viewed against the backdrop of the demise of the
centralized, government directed incomes policy since . All actors
had some difficulty in adjusting to the new institutions. The inability of
social partners to reach an agreement made them look to the government
to solve their problems. The government in turn did not hesitate to act
as a principal by determining incomes policy as all coalition governments
of all persuasions had been accustomed to do prior to . To put it in
other words, old habits die slowly. Clearly, the new institutions were not
yet internalized.
The non-corporatist government strategy in  and  on the
other hand, must be understood within the context of the macro-
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economic effects of the first oil crisis of . As social partners could not
come to an agreement in  and  due to their widely differing
preferences and views how to react to the effects of the oil crisis, the
government felt compelled to take over incomes policy in an effort to
counter these negative macroeconomic effects (see Table ).
Sixteen years later, in , the context for negotiations on incomes
policy was markedly different. Negotiations were decentralized, whereas
deficit reduction (in view of the EMU (European Monetary Union)
restrictions) was the government’s primary concern. All three parties
went their separate ways. Central negotiations did not take place.
Negotiations at that time were decentralized and resulted in compromises
between trade unions and employers’ organizations in which trade
unions managed to get their way to a large extent. As the government’s
policies with regard to the (semi-) public sector (deficit reduction) were
not in jeopardy – the linkage between market sector and (semi-) public
sector was only partially restored (see Hemerijck : ff; Woldendorp
: –), the government left responsibility for incomes policy in the
market sector to social partners.
The non-corporatist government strategies employed by coalition
governments of CDA and PvdA can be explained by the peculiarities
of negotiations on incomes policy in the years in which these strategies
were employed. In all four years, social partners could either not come
to an agreement on the central level, or did not want to negotiate on
the central level. In , the government reacted by reverting to the
trusted pattern of the centrally directed incomes policy and imposed
incomes policy. In  and , the government also responded by
imposing incomes policy, but this time it was an emergency policy to
boost the economy in order to counter the macroeconomic effects of the
 oil crisis. Lastly, in , the government remained passive with
regard to incomes policy in the market sector because there was no
immediate threat of a spill over from that sector to the (semi-) public
sector.
This discussion of the non-corporatist government strategies of gov-
ernments of CDA and PvdA indicates that it was a combination of
macroeconomic circumstances and institutional change with regard to
incomes policy (from guided to free incomes policy, linkage-delinkage
and EMU) that seems to account for the actors’ behaviour and led these
governments to implement non-corporatist government strategies. Our
conclusion is that there is reason to argue that when Social Democracy
is in government together with Christian Democracy co-operation and
consensus is indeed promoted, but that this endeavour is quite sensitive
to economic mishaps, the attitude of social partners and institutional
constraints.
The Contingency of Corporatist Inﬂuence 
CDA and VVD coalitions: Inactive, passive or directing?
Recall that we hold the low performance of the CDA with regard to
corporatist government intermediation as puzzling. Although the CDA
was the dominant party whilst in government (see Table ), a CDA-VVD
coalition actively pursued an opening corporatist strategy in  per cent
() of the  years they were in office together (Table Appendix). This
figure decreased to  per cent (), implying that apparently centre-right
coalitions tended to choose the stick rather than the carrot for the
concluding strategy. The non-corporatist strategies of these governments
were concentrated between  and  and between  and .
What happened in these periods?
From government control to free negotiations: –
During these years the institutional context of industrial relations shifted
quite strongly. After  there was a gradual transition from a
centralized, government directed incomes policy to a free incomes policy.
After the demise of the centralized, government directed incomes policy
of the period –, the search was on for a new system and
procedure of central negotiations on incomes policy. The aim was to find
a system that left negotiations between trade unions and employers’
organizations free from continuous binding government intervention, but
at the same time produced a moderate incomes policy. In , the
system of free negotiations on incomes policy between trade unions and
employers’ organizations was formalized in the Law on Wage Formation.
However, government reserved the authority to intervene in these
negotiations. Based on clause , government could still intervene directly
in individual collective contracts, as opposed to not declaring them
binding. And clause  gave government the authority to impose binding
general measures. Due to stiff opposition by the trade unions, clause 
was in effect not used.
Trade unions and employers’ organizations had some difficulties to
adjust to the new situation after the demise of the centralized, govern-
ment directed incomes policy. Their continued inability to reach agree-
ment reinforced the habitual tendency of governments of all persuasions
to take over again the determination of incomes policy as they were used
to do from  until . This seems to have been the case in ,
, and also  when the government concluded its involvement
in the negotiations on incomes policy with a binding non-corporatist
strategy.
However,  is a special case. Negotiations on incomes policy were
easily concluded with a bipartite Central Agreement between trade
unions and employers’ organizations. The conflict between trade unions
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and the government on clause  of the Law on Wage Formation spilled
over to incomes policy negotiations as well and resulted in trade unions
and employers’ organizations refusing to co-operate with the govern-
ment on incomes policy. This induced the government to unilaterally
intervene in the Central Agreement on price indexation with a binding
intervention. This time, it was not the unwillingness of social partners to
reach an agreement, but there was a political conflict between trade
unions and the government that got in the way of the implementation of
the Central Agreement that was reached.
In , , and , on the other hand, the government concluded
its involvement in negotiations on incomes policy by means of a passive
strategy to give social partners the opportunity to come to a negotiated
agreement. In  and  the negotiations between social partners
broke down in large scale strikes and other industrial conflicts.
Incomes policy in  was completely determined by the effects of a
number of wild-cat strikes that started in the ports of Rotterdam and
were taken over by the trade unions. The government started with taking
a firm stand on wages, but retracted its proposed package to give trade
unions and employers’ organizations a chance to come to an agreement.
In addition, the government promised not to make use of clause  of the
Law on Wage Formation to facilitate central negotiations. However,
central negotiations broke down, employers’ organizations refused to
negotiate and asked the outgoing government to intervene. The govern-
ment duly intervened with a policy package that included a binding wage
measure. Trade unions resented this intervention and redressed its effects
after expiration. The incoming government wanted to patch-up relations
with the trade unions and to give a new procedure for negotiations on
incomes policy devised by the SER (Sociaal Economische Raad – Social and
Economic Council), a fair chance. Consequently, the previous govern-
ment’s binding policy package was retroactively abolished, and the
incoming government refrained from further intervention in incomes
policy.
In , the government did not intervene in incomes policy in order
to give the new procedure devised by the SER a fair chance, although
central negotiations broke down before they had even properly started.
Employers’ organizations refused to negotiate a Central Agreement.
Negotiations continued on the decentral level, accompanied by strikes.
In this period, it was the combination of institutional changes in the
annual process of negotiation and implementation of incomes policy and
the behaviour of the actors involved that determined the outcome of that
process. Government strategy aimed at bringing social partners to a
Central Agreement, either by force (a binding top-down strategy) or by
persuasion and negotiation (corporatist strategy). Due to the different
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preferences of social partners, the process of negotiations frequently led
to deadlocks, making Central Agreements not feasible. There was,
apparently, little trust (den Butter and Mosch ) and communication
between actors. The government, therefore, in the end was left with two
options. Either to take over incomes policy to end the confrontations and
deadlocks between social partners by reverting to the trusted pattern of
the centralized, government directed incomes policy of before , or to
leave social partners to their own devices and refrain from intervention.
Before , the government usually opted for directing incomes policy.
After , with the introduction of the new Law on Wage Formation,
the government opted for the passive strategy and refrained from
intervention in an effort to give the new system of negotiations on
incomes policy a fair chance.
Crisis management of a changing economy: –
Government strategy in this period has to be understood within the
context of the effects of the two oil crises in  and / on
economic developments and incomes policy. After , incomes in the
market sector and in the (semi-) public sector had become firmly linked.
However, in the wake of the severe economic recession between  and
, government delinked the (semi-) public sector from the market
sector (–) and reduction of the budget deficit by reducing the
(semi-) public sector became the government’s main policy aim, albeit
with little success (Table ; Green-Pedersen ).
In the period –, the economic situation gradually worsened,
as an effect of the second oil crisis in / and the emerging
de-industralization (Maddison ). Incomes policy in these years was
determined by the government’s policy programme that aimed at a
reduction of the rapidly increasing budget deficit. To that effect, incomes
policy in the market sector had to result in moderation. Because of all the
linking mechanisms between the market sector and the (semi-) public
sector, a moderate incomes policy in the market sector made it more
feasible to achieve moderation in the (semi-) public sector as well. This in
turn would contribute to a reduction of (the rate of increase of) the deficit.
To reach this objective, co-operation and collaboration of social partners
was required.
Trade unions and employers’ organizations were, however, unable to
reach any Central Agreement, although they came quite close in .
The main obstacle was their widely differing views on how to tackle the
economic problems that led to the ever growing budget deficits. Neither
party was prepared to give an inch on the issue of incomes. Conse-
quently, to reach its objective of a reduction of the deficit, government
took the lead in incomes policy in these years. Given the combined effect
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of the economic crisis and the linkage between market sector and (semi-)
public sector on macroeconomic performance and the government’s
budget on the one hand, and social partner’s inability to reach agreement
on the other, leaving incomes policy to social partners was no option. In
addition, a corporatist strategy seemed not feasible.
Nevertheless, government refrained from intervention in incomes
policy between  and . This behaviour was the effect of the
Wassenaar Agreement that determined incomes policy in the market
sector in these years. The Wassenaar Agreement was struck between trade
unions and employers’ organizations in  under strong pressure by the
incoming government led by Lubbers (CDA). The main aim of social
partners was to keep the government out of incomes policy in the market
sector that had been completely government directed between  and
. The agreement effected an exchange between price compensation
and working hours. This exchange resulted in wage moderation in the
market sector. Through all linking mechanisms this moderation extended
to the (semi-) public sector as well. All in all, this gave the government
some breathing space to develop a new policy package as regards
incomes policy for the (semi-) public sector. First, in , all linking
mechanisms were put on hold. Next, in , a cut in real terms of wages,
pensions and benefits in the (semi-) public sector was implemented. On
the issue of incomes policy, negotiations in the market sector were
minimal as most collective contracts struck in , covered  as well.
The government, therefore, did not need to intervene in incomes policy
in the market sector.
In  and , the government continued its programme of cuts in
the (semi-) public sector. Some of these cuts affected the market sector as
well. Central negotiations did not result in any bipartite or tripartite
agreement. Decentral negotiations were characterized by strikes and
other industrial conflicts in which trade unions tried to redress at least
part of the government’s policy package. For example, the collective
contracts were in fact tit-for-tat compromises: government cuts in social
security were repaired, but at the cost of the trade unions’ demands for
a –hour working week. Instead, they had to agree to the continuation
of other forms of reducing the working week, like early retirement, part
time jobs, more holidays, and the like. Real wage rises were no real issue
and quite a few collective contracts struck in  again covered two
years instead of one. Although trade unions managed to redress the effect
of the government’s policy package, and costs for employers went up, the
net result remained wage moderation, which was the aim of government
policy. The scarce resources available in the market sector had to be used
to redress the government’s austerity measures, instead to increase wages.
And, with all linking mechanisms put on hold, there was no danger of a
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spill-over to the (semi-) public sector. Consequently, for the government
there was no incentive to intervene actively in incomes policy in the
market sector.
In the s centre-right governments clearly choose a different mode
of involvement in incomes policy. Rather than attempting to actively
guide the process of reaching an agreement that we characterize as
corporatist, it developed a new set of guidelines (institutions) in order to
manage the crisis of the budget deficit in a situation of a recession that
was graver than ever before. This very period can thus be characterized
as both passive and directive, but not corporatist. This resulted in an
institutional change, where government allowed decentralization of
negotiations, and forced a delinkage of market induced incomes from the
(semi-) public sector. Institutional change and macro-economic develop-
ments obviously have been conducive to a different pattern of govern-
ment intervention in incomes policy in the Netherlands (Table ).
PvdA and VVD governments: The era of purple politics (–)
In contrast to the s, the purple coalition took a different road to
coalesce social parties into its policy-making efforts. Instead of controlling
from a distance, but setting (strict) rules that defined the room to
manoeuvre of the social partners, the coalition returned to the strategy of
a corporatist government intermediation in all years it was in office (see
Table Appendix). Several reasons can be mentioned to understand this
change of mind and policy. Government strategy in this period has to be
understood within the context of the preparation for the Euro in ,
coinciding with the economic recovery after . Applying the EMU
criteria meant that the government’s policy continued to aim at a
reduction of the budget deficit and the state debt. Economic recovery at
the same time ensured the continuation of a partial and ad-hoc relinking
of the market sector and the (semi-) public sector during this period, but
for the year  (Table ; Slomp ; van Waarden ).
In , central negotiations on (un)employment and wage moderation
did not lead to a Central Agreement. Especially the government’s
delinking of wages and benefits in the market sector and the (semi-) public
sector was rejected by the trade unions. Nevertheless, parties agreed to a
joint investigation how to create more jobs as an input for negotiations in
. In exchange, social security premiums and other levies were
lowered to prop up buying power. Although decentral negotiations on
incomes policy were characterized by strikes and other conflicts, the wage
demands were met to a large extent. In other words, without a Central
Agreement consensus and compromise were found at the decentral
level.
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Apparently, the first year of economic policy-making by the purple
coalition has been – in retrospect – characterized by developing a new
practice of negotiating incomes policy. Instead of developing overall
packages at the central level another game was played: government more
or less kept its distance, but provided guidelines (derived from the EMU
criteria), on the one hand, and, on the other hand, means to develop
active labour market policies (Visser and Hemerijck ; Keman ).
The negotiations were shaped in two ways: one, tit-for-tat became a rule
of the game that was practiced; two, if a stalemate arose then another rule
was introduced: taking-it-in-turns – meaning that the one-year round of
negotiations were less constraining than before to come to an agreement
(Scharpf ; Keman ).
Taking into account the positive economic circumstances and the
enlarged institutional room for all actors to manoeuvre, the purple
approach has clearly paid off in terms of corporatist intermediation. In
our view, this results from the institutional changes in the annual process
of negotiation and implementation of incomes policy through the partial
and ad hoc relinkage of incomes in the market sector and incomes in the
(semi-)public sector. Together with a strict budgetary discipline enforced
by the EMU criteria, and the economic recovery, the behaviour of the
actors involved could be disciplined to play the new game. In the end,
this determined the outcome of that process. Non-corporatist govern-
ment strategies appeared not an option. A passive attitude by govern-
ment was no option given the requirements of the EMU that demanded
active intervention in a relinked incomes policy to uphold budgetary
discipline. A binding strategy was also no option given the conditional
character of the relinkage and an economic recovery that precluded
binding government interventions in incomes policy. In summary: we
contend that both government and social partners played the game that
was most likely the best practice.
Conclusion of the Dutch puzzle part one
The combination of macroeconomic circumstances and the institutional
rearrangement of the process of negotiations on incomes policy are
important to understand the puzzle of variations in government strategy.
In our view it is the socio-economic context of an open economy
(Katzenstein ) that is contingent on complex policy-making (Scharpf
). In the s macroeconomic circumstances were favourable,
but the change from a centralized, government directed incomes policy
to a free incomes policy frequently led to conflicts between social
partners. Coalition governments of CDA and VVD tried to solve these
conflicts during negotiations, but as that proved usually unsuccessful, in
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the end these governments quite often reverted to a non-corporatist
strategy.
In the late s and early s, these coalition governments had to
contend with a severe deterioration of macroeconomic performance that
was exacerbated by the institutional linkage between the market sector
and the (semi-) public sector. Despite all attempts, these governments
usually did not succeed in bringing social partners to an agreement
(Table Appendix). In the end they therefore usually reverted to the
binding strategy. After the de-linkage in –, these governments
reverted to passive strategies.
In summary, we have demonstrated that the annual negotiations
leading up to finding an agreement between government and social
partners are influenced by macro-economic developments and the
institutional changes that were introduced by the government (a change
from guided to free incomes policy, decentralization of negotiations,
linkage and delinkage of market and semi-public sectors as well as
reformations of laws covering wage settlements). It is this patterned
variation over time that allows us to understand the puzzling relationship
between the colours of coalitions and their choice of strategy. ‘ It is’, to
quote Clinton, ‘ the economy, stupid!’. The cyclical developments as well
as the openness of the Dutch economy shape the political room for
manoeuvre of government. This interplay of circumstances and political
action to a large extent solves the puzzling variation of the politics of
corporatist intermediation that we have analysed.
The Dutch puzzle part two: Social Democracy and corporatist policy performance
It is obvious from the Dutch data that social democratic participation in
government appears to be more effective in achieving a Central Agree-
ment. Corporatist strategies of coalitions in which Social Democracy
participated were twice as effective (% and % respectively) as other
coalitions (%) (calculations based on Table Appendix). It appears that
the international hypothesis as regards the positive role of Social
Democracy is a tenable one. However, the data also show that non-
corporatist strategies of CDA-VVD governments were more effective
(%) than non-corporatist strategies of coalitions in which Social
Democracy participated (%). In this section we shall therefore focus
more closely on policy performance when the PvdA is in office and when
not.
Social Democracy and eﬀective corporatist intermediation
Arguably, if the relationship between Social Democracy and corporatism
is to be scrutinized in view of the eventual results, we ought to distinguish
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between coalition governance by the PvdA before and after . Before,
the PvdA was never dominant in the socio-economic policy area.
Bearing this in mind, two conclusions can be drawn from the data.
First, corporatist intermediation by itself does not necessarily lead to
Central Agreements. Second, the interaction between concluding corpo-
ratist strategies and resulting Central Agreements is not dramatically
different in both periods:  per cent as compared to %. The polder
model of the purple coalition of PvdA and VVD was not more effective
than previous coalitions of CDA and PvdA.
The main difference between Social Democracy in government and
not is that governments with the PvdA have been more persistent than
those without the PvdA in pursuing a corporatist solution throughout the
whole period. To illustrate this point: the percentages for he whole period
are: CDA and a corporatist opening strategy is  per cent versus the
PvdA %. In addition, CDA and a corporatist concluding strategy is 
per cent and for the PvdA again %. In other words: governments with
the PvdA are clearly more persistent in finding a consensual solution,
whereas governments without the PvdA revert to a more authoritative
type of problem solving (calculations based on Table Appendix).
We conclude from this comparison that Social Democracy in the
Netherlands matters as regards corporatist intermediation and ensuing
Central Agreements. The performance rate of Social Democracy is
higher over the whole period. But how can we explain the difference
between governments with and without the PvdA? And how can we
explain that these governments’ non-corporatist intermediation was
more effective?
Corporatist intermediation of CDA and VVD governments
We will discuss the effective corporatist strategies of CDA and VVD
coalition governments in  and , as well as the ineffective
corporatist strategies of these governments in , , , and .
This elaboration will support our contention that the combination of
macroeconomic circumstances and institutional changes appear to be
related to the effectiveness of the behaviour of both governments and
social partners.
Effective corporatist intermediation by CDA-VVD coalitions were few
and far between. In addition, the macroeconomic and institutional
contexts were markedly different. In , in the context of a positive
macroeconomic performance (Table ), the first steps toward a free
incomes policy were tentatively taken. The government was consistently
involved as a third party in the annual process of negotiations on incomes
policy and tried to broker at least a bi-partite, but preferably a tri-partite
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Central Agreement between trade unions, employers’ organizations and
the government. When negotiations bogged down in a deadlock, it was
the government that resolved the deadlock with a proposal that was
grudgingly accepted by both parties. Social partners were testing each
other’s strength and had to be assisted by the government to reach a
compromise.
In the late s, in a context of severe macroeconomic and budgetary
problems, incomes policy in the (semi-) public and private sectors had
been delinked. The government’s main policy aim was reduction of the
budget deficit, and reducing the levels of social security benefits was an
important policy instrument. As a consequence, negotiations on incomes
policy in the market sector were decentralized, whereas central negotia-
tions primarily featured employment (and social security) issues. In ,
the government finally managed to get trade unions and employers’
organizations to participate in a tripartite Central Agreement in which
parties renewed their commitment to previous bipartite and tripartite
agreements on employment policies. Decentral negotiations on incomes
policy resulted in a tit-for-tat exchange between working hours and social
security benefits.
Ineffective corporatist intermediation by CDA-VVD coalitions were
all due to disagreement with and between social partners, although
the macroeconomic and institutional contexts differed. The Central
Agreement in  was a classical case of reordering or compensating
preferences based on each actor’s agenda. The successful reordering at
the national level, however, ran into difficulties with the rank and file of
the national organizations during implementation. Although social
partners at the national level had agreed to a reordering of preferences,
arranged by the government’s corporatist intermediation, they could not
deliver at the decentral level.
In  social partners refused to conclude a Central Agreement based
on the government’s policy package that included public sector spending
cuts as well as incentives for the trade unions. These remained opposed
to an agreement. The government stuck to its corporatist strategy and
even enlarged its proposed package as it did not want to sour its relations
with the trade unions any further so soon after it had come to power (see
Table Appendix).
In the s, in a context of severe macroeconomic and budgetary
difficulties, incomes policy in the (semi-) public sector had been delinked
from that in the market sector. The government’s main policy aim was
reduction of the budget deficit. Reducing social security benefits was an
important policy instrument. In that context, the government’s corpora-
tist strategy was unsuccessful in bringing social partners to an agreement.
In , employers’ organizations rejected any Central Agreement. Their
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agenda differed fundamentally from that of the trade unions. Govern-
ment policy could not bridge the gap and central negotiations on incomes
policy broke down. Nevertheless, based on the government’s policy
package, a number of joint working parties on employment issued reports
that served as a basis for decentral negotiations. The government
encouraged decentral negotiations on incomes policy as well as central
consultations on employment issues by offering compensatory corporatist
policies. As the linkage between the market sector and the (semi-) public
sector was still severed, the government’s policy aim of reduction of the
budget deficit was not in jeopardy.
In , despite various attempts and offers by the government, central
negotiations again did not result in a Central Agreement. Tripartite
negotiations on the long-term unemployed foundered on the FNV
(Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging – the main trade union organization in
the Netherlands), while tripartite negotiations on the issues of sick leave
and disability only resulted in the institution of a working group that was
to devise concrete policies for the future. Social partners again disagreed
on the major issues of incomes policy. Like in , government policy
could not bridge the gap between their agendas, but at least managed to
keep negotiations and consultations more or less going. And the linkage
between the market sector and the (semi-) public sector remained
severed.
Eﬀective non-corporatist intermediation of CDA and VVD governments
Non-corporatist strategies of governments without the PvdA were more
successful (%) than non-corporatist strategies by PvdA governments
(%) in ,  and  (calculations based on Table Appendix). In
, in a favourable macroeconomic context, a political conflict between
trade unions and the government over the Law on Wage Formation
spilled over to incomes policy of that year and induced the government
to unilaterally intervene in the Central Agreement that had been reached
by corporatist intermediation.
In  and , in the midst of the most severe post war recession, the
Wassenaar Agreement was forced upon social partners by the government.
The government announced it would continue to determine incomes
policy unilaterally as in , , and  if no agreement in the market
sector would be reached. And despite their continued differences of
opinion social partners indeed favoured a bipartite agreement on incomes
policy in the market sector more than the continuation of a completely
government directed incomes policy that made them redundant. Incomes
policy in the (semi-) public sector, however, remained firmly under
government control, despite heavy opposition by the trade unions.
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Conclusion of the Dutch puzzle part two
The puzzle of the variation in effectiveness of corporatist and non-
corporatist strategies of coalitions with and without the PvdA should be
understood by the games played by the social partners. These games
were based on adversarial preferences which emanated mainly from the
context of macroeconomic problems, and were also partly driven by the
institutional changes in the framework of incomes policy formation that
were effected by the government. When social partners were unwilling to
come to an agreement, based on their widely differing preferences,
Central Agreements usually could not be struck, despite all efforts by the
government to find consensus. In this respect there is little difference
between coalitions with or without the PvdA.
Effective corporatist strategies of governments of CDA and VVD were
few and far between:  and  must be considered as idiosyncrasies.
Effective corporatist strategies of governments of CDA and PvdA in the
early s were due to the annual flexibility of government regarding
the (re)linkage that induced trade unions to sign up to Central Agree-
ments within a context of macroeconomic ups and downs. Effective
corporatist strategies of governments of PvdA and VVD were due to the
same context and effect, but also driven by the EMU requirements and
helped by an accelerating economic growth. The effectiveness of corpo-
ratist strategies was not enhanced when the PvdA became the dominant
partner in government after . In other words, participation of the
PvdA in government after  with VVD did not produce a more
effective polder model in terms of Central Agreements. As far as the data
allow we conclude that the PvdA played an important role in enhancing
corporatist intermediation when in government, but not one completely
different from the other parties as many Dutch and other authors have
suggested.
Finally, effective non-corporatist government strategies of CDA and
VVD governments can be explained by the effect of the macroeconomic
context on the behaviour of the actors involved as well.
The Dutch puzzle resolved: Social Democracy and corporatist policy formation
reviewed
During the s, Dutch government was internationally applauded with
respect to its apparent capabilities to restore the economy and public
sector in such a fashion that its performance looked almost a miracle (see:
Becker ; Keman ). In large part, so the story went, this was due
to successfully utilizing its corporatist mode of policy formation (Visser
and Hemerijck ). At first glance, this success story appears indeed
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as miraculous and the corporatist explanation as fitting the facts. In
addition, the recovery of the Dutch economy and adjustment of the
welfare state seemed to underscore the idea that politics matters and
concerted policy-making makes a difference. Finally, the crucial role of
parties in government was recognized, in particular of Dutch Social
Democracy: the PvdA.
In this paper we set out to examine both the role of corporatist
intermediation and that of parties in government with respect to the
formation of incomes policy in the Netherlands between –. The
aim was to assess the claims as regards the usefulness of corporatism for
incomes policy formation and whether or not parties in coalition
government, Social Democracy in particular, do play a differential role in
this. The dependent variable has been the achievement of a Central
Agreement as a result of the annual tri-partite consultations and
negotiations (Woldendorp ). On the basis of preliminary findings two
puzzles arose. One, that there is a relative underperformance in making
corporatism work despite the fact that governments are dominated by
Christian Democracy, often together with Social Democracy. Two, the
noticeable difference in reaching a Central Agreement when Social
Democracy participated in government in comparison with coalitions
without Social Democracy.
Our analysis has shown that governments of CDA and VVD scored
comparatively low with respect to the number of corporatist strategies as
well as Central Agreements due to the combination of fluctuating
macroeconomic circumstances and institutional changes regarding the
negotiation process of incomes policy. However, these circumstances and
constraints were prevalent in times that the PvdA has been in office as
well. Both coalition governments found themselves constrained by the
economic vulnerabilities (openness and de-industrialization), on the one
hand, and the indirect effect of welfare related entitlements (linking
private sector wage levels to the (semi-) public sector), on the other hand.
Our main conclusion as regards the first puzzle is therefore that
corporatism, as a governmental strategy, should not be treated as an
effect-producing variable but rather as an intervening variable. This
conclusion also implies that on the basis of this case study we dispute that
corporatism is a policy arrangement that is highly institutionalized and
constant over time. We think this wrong and claim that the Dutch
case – generally considered as a typical case of corporatism – reinforces
the point that corporatism must be understood as an intervening vari-
able to analyse the process of economic policy formation in pluralist
democracies.
That governments in which the PvdA participated scored relatively
better on both corporatist government strategies and Central Agreement
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is due to the fact that these governments usually persevered in the initial
strategy or opening bid within the tri-partite negotiations instead of
reverting to a passive or binding strategy in the concluding stage of
negotiations on a Central Agreement. Of course, the effects of economic
circumstances and institutional changes also had their impact. Yet, the
fact remains that Social Democracy has performed better in the
Netherlands when in government.
If one looks at the whole pattern of incomes policy co-ordination by
means of corporatist concertation, it is immediately clear that the
majority of cases (annual rounds of negotiating a Central Agreement)
appear to have been conducted by the social partners as if it were
one-shot games. In other words, the puzzles become less puzzling if it is
recognized that the time horizon of each actor involved differs. In
addition, governments increasingly lacked institutional means and –
when the economic situation was seen to be deteriorating – were faced
with a reduced policy room for manoeuvre. So we argue that corporatist
intermediation needs certain conditions to be able to operate as intended.
The combination of insufficient room to manoeuvre due to external
factors (like the economy and EMU requirements), delinkage measures
and decentralization of the tri-partite negotiations (institutional con-
straints) and the differences in time horizons produced a variation of
outcomes that cannot solely be attributed to social democratic partici-
pation in coalition government. Like corporatism, social democratic
participation in government does matter, but rather as an intervening
variable. This conclusion, put forward on the basis of our empirical
examination of the Dutch case, is too often overlooked in other studies
claiming a direct relation between Social Democracy, corporatism and
incomes policy-making in European democracies.
Appendix
In this study we use a classification of corporatist intermediation between
government and the recognized social partners (employers’ organizations
and trade union federations) in the Netherlands. Its basic structure is to
relate governmental strategy with respect to incomes policy concertation
to styles of decision-making pursued by social actors (Scharpf ;
Keman ). Four options of government involvement and three styles
of decision-making are distinguished:
Government strategy Style of decision-making
I – Passive A–Confrontation
II – Co-operative B – Bargaining
III – Congruent C – Problem solving
IV – Guiding
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Government’s fourfold strategy involves two choices: corporatist involve-
ment in incomes policy or not, and active and passive. The difference
between strategy I and II is referring to active (II) or not (I) as well as to
corporatist involvement (II) or not (I). Strategies III and IV are also
T A: Annual scores for strategic behaviour of actors and outcome in
Central Agreements
Year Opening strategy
corporatist
intermediation
Concluding strategy
corporatist
intermediation
Central Agreement
on incomes policy
Composition of
party government
 IIIA IIIB Yes CDA-VVD
 IB IVB No CDA-PvdA
 IVB IVB No CDA-VVD
 IVB IB No CDA-VVD
 IVA IVA No CDA-VVD
 IIC IVC Yes CDA-VVD
 IVB IA No CDA-VVD
 IIB IA No CDA-VVD
 IIB IIA No CDA-VVD
 IIA IVB No CDA-PvdA
 IIB IIB No CDA-PvdA
 IIA IVB No CDA-PvdA
 IIB IIB Yes CDA-PvdA
 IIA IIB No CDA-PvdA
 IVA IIA No CDA-VVD
 IIB IVB No CDA-VVD
 IIIA IVA No CDA-VVD
 IB IVB No CDA-VVD
 IIIA IC Yes CDA-VVD
 IC IC Yes CDA-VVD
 IVB IB No CDA-VVD
 IA IA No CDA-VVD
 IIB IIIB Yes CDA-VVD
 IIA IIA No CDA-VVD
 IIB IIB No CDA-VVD
 IIIC IIIB Yes CDA-PvdA
 IVA IIB Yes CDA-PvdA
 IA IA No CDA-PvdA
 IIIB IIIB Yes CDA-PvdA
 IVA IIC Yes CDA-PvdA
 IIA IIA No PvdA-VVD
 IIB IIB Yes PvdA-VVD
 IIB IIB Yes PvdA-VVD
 IIB IIB Yes PvdA-VVD
 IIIB IIIC Yes PvdA-VVD
 IIB IIB No PvdA-VVD
Source: Woldendorp : –.
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defined in terms of corporatist involvement (III is yes and IV is no), but
government is always active.
The styles of decision-making can be understood in game theoretic
terms and are derived from Scharpf (: –; see also Scharpf ).
Confrontation represents conflict with little room for agreement (A).
Bargaining is based on self-interested behaviour, however, with a possible
outcome that represents an equilibrium (B). Finally, problem solving is a
different game; here we assume that all actors have an eye for the
collective outcome (C). It should be noted that we allow for changing
styles and strategies during the process of annual negotiations.
As a result we have  ( ) possible situations that characterise these
negotiations in relation to the outcome: a Central Agreement is achieved
or not. These are categorized and classified for each annual round of
negotiations between  and . The results of the data analysis are
reported below and are used throughout the text.
NOTES
. Purple is the result of mixing the red of Labour (PvdA – Partij van de Arbeid) with the blue of the
conservative liberals (VVD – Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie).
. Incomes policy is part of a broader macroeconomic programme in the Netherlands after World
War II and is identified as the key policy instrument for co-operative management of the economy
by party government, trade unions and employers’ organisations (Molina and Rhodes ; Slomp
; van Waarden ; Woldendorp ).
. The policy agreement on incomes policy between the three actors involved. Bi-partite agreements are
directly struck between social partners (trade unions and employers’ organisations), whereas tri-partite
indicates an agreement between social partners and the government. The latter type prevails in the
Netherlands. Central Agreements are annually negotiated (Woldendorp  and Appendix).
. The linkage came in force in  with the policy package of the government Den Uyl (CDA-PvdA).
Wages, benefits and pensions in the (semi-) public became linked to the statutory minimum wage
() and to the average rise in collectively agreed wages in the market sector. In  this linkage
became statutory (Law on Adjustment Mechanisms). Consequently, incomes policy in the market
sector had a direct effect on incomes in the (semi-) public sector and on the government’s budget
(deficit). From , the linkage was put on hold; since  it is conditional (Law on Conditional
Indexation)(Visser and Hemerijck :  ff.).
. In the international debate on corporatism most researchers view corporatism as an (independent)
institutional variable indicated by consensus between government and social partners that explains
a.o. economic performance. See for instance Schmidt ; Alvarez et al. ; Kurzer ;
Western ; Cre´paz ; Pennings ; Lijphart ; Siaroff ; Traxler and Kittel ;
Kenworthy .
. It concerned the KVP (Katholieke Volkspartij), ARP (Anti-Revolutionaire Partij) and CHU (Christelijk
Historische Unie) that decided to merge in  and in fact did so in  as CDA (Christen-
Democratisch Appe`l).
. Only in the CDA-PvdA coalition of – that was responsible for incomes policy in –
the situation was different for the CDA. The PvdA held the premiership (Den Uyl) and the ministry
of Finance (Duisenberg, the later president of the ECB). KVP and ARP held the Ministries of
Economic and Social Affairs. The CHU did not participate in the coalition. Moreover, the coalition
was not solidly based on a policy agreement and not fully supported in parliament by the
constituent parties (Andeweg and Irwin ).
. As reported in the Appendix the classification is divided into an opening and concluding strategy
of government. This indicates the first bid in the annual round of negotiations and subsequently
whether or not this changed during the process.
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. EMU criteria included a public debt of not more than  per cent of GDP; an annual budget
deficit of not more than  per cent of GDP; and an inflation rate on or very near the European
average.
. The government’s main instrument for deficit reduction had been the delinkage of wages and
benefits (including pensions) in the (semi-) public sector from wages in the market sector between
 and . The linkage had been restored on an ad hoc basis since , but as a consequence
of the third oil crisis of  and the subsequent world recession of – in the wake of the
first Gulf war, the linkage was only partially in force in .
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